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Abstract 
The Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) market is a monopsony facing oligopoly. In the 
last four decades, the Department of Defense has placed a great deal of emphasis in its 
acquisition reform efforts on the power of competition to help control cost overruns and cost 
growth. In this research, quantitative analyses were used to determine the effect of two reform 
measures—competitive prototyping and competitive contracting—on cost overruns and cost 
growth during the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase of the acquisition 
life cycle. We performed a case study of 63 hardware MDAP contracts from all services. The 
findings show that while competitive prototyping and competitive contracting lead to greater 
competition, as the defense acquisition community believes, they fail to control cost overruns and 
cost growth, just as microeconomic theory predicts. 
Introduction 
Concerns over the increasing cost of U.S. defense programs are not new. In fact, 
according to Cancian (2010), these concerns date back as far as the earliest days of our 
republic when Congress, in its oversight role, began questioning the rising costs of the first 
naval ships, which it authorized in 1794 (Cancian, 2010). Since then, there have been 
numerous attempts at defense acquisition reform with the goal of controlling cost overruns and 
cost growth. Two of the most recent and significant acquisition reform initiatives are Congress’s 
Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009 and a series of U.S. Department of 
Defense (DoD) initiatives championed by Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) Frank Kendall, called Better Buying Power (BBP). Both the 
WSARA and BBP place a great deal of emphasis on the power of competition in controlling 
defense acquisition costs and in particular, the cost of Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
(MDAPs).  
Despite decades of effort and frequent attempts to control cost overruns and cost growth 
in MDAPs, these latest initiatives and their predecessors have failed to achieve their objectives 
regarding cost (Ritschel et al., 2019). Defense acquisition reforms based on competition fail to 
control cost overruns and cost growth in hardware MDAPs. The question is why. The 
straightforward answer is microeconomics.  
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Extensive research exists studying defense acquisition program costs—both overruns 
and growth. Most studies focused on program management techniques and acquisition policies 
from the point of view of the government customer with scant attention to defense acquisition 
reforms from the perspective of industry and the market (i.e., microeconomics). This research 
uses quantitative analysis to provide insight into whether reform initiatives based on competition 
contribute to the reduction of cost overruns and cost growth in MDAPs. 
Background 
To meet the performance requirements, engineers must work within specific design 
constraints such as system weight, size, and shape, but ultimately systems are constrained by 
fundamental laws of nature such as the laws of motion, gravitation, and thermodynamics. 
Similarly, there are many constraints imposed on cost, but ultimately cost is subject to the laws 
of economics such as the law of supply and demand.  
Summarizing from Edwin Mansfield’s (1982) undergraduate-level textbook, 
Microeconomics Theory and Applications, economics is in two broad branches—
microeconomics and macroeconomic. Microeconomics deals with how individual consumers, 
firms, and resource owners behave, while macroeconomics is concerned with the behavior of 
economic aggregates such as inflation, gross national product, and level of employment. In 
microeconomics, firms operate in markets that are a collection of buyers and sellers for a 
particular good or service, and the behavior of each market type can be modeled by a demand 
side and a supply side—the market structure.  
According to microeconomics, there are four types of market structures: perfect 
competition, monopoly, monopolistic competition, and oligopoly. How the price (cost) of a good 
or service is determined is different depending on the market structure. In perfect competition, 
the equilibrium price—the price at which there is no tendency to change—is determined where 
the quantity versus price schedule of buyers (i.e., the demand curve) crosses the quantity 
versus price schedule of sellers (i.e., the supply curve). In an oligopoly, the equilibrium price 
occurs at the profit maximizing quantity where the marginal cost equals marginal revenue. Firms 
in an oligopoly adjust their outputs to gain a share of the profit maximizing quantity (Mansfield, 
1982). 
A key component of many cost control strategies involves the use of measures to 
increase competition based on the idea that competition leads to lower price (cost) or can 
control cost overruns or cost growth. Competitive contracting has been required by law since 
2000, and in 2009, WSARA included a requirement to use competitive prototyping to promote 
competition and control cost despite microeconomics suggesting otherwise.  
Our belief was that this confidence in the power of competition is based on a 
misapplication of microeconomic theory. It assumes that the perfect competition model, where 
there are many buyers and many sellers, is representative of the MDAP market.  
The U.S. economic system is built on the concept of free enterprise 
regulated by competition. ... The defense industry does not fit that model. 
Many defense acquisition problems are rooted in the mistaken belief that 
the defense industry and the government–industry relationship in defense 
acquisition fit naturally into the free enterprise model. (Fox, 2011) 
However, the MDAP market has a monopsony–oligopoly structure, so the perfect 
competition model does not apply. The supply side of the MDAP market is an oligopoly, and 
according to microeconomic theory, firms in an oligopoly market do not compete on price. This 
is because, as Fudenberg and Tirole (2013) explained, if one firm cuts price to gain market 
share, this tends to lead to a price war where others in the market react by cutting their price. 
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The result hurts all players, since “the long-run costs of the price war outweigh any short-run 
gain” (Fundenberg & Tirole, 2013). 
Competition in the defense market is so often cited as an important tool in fighting cost 
overruns and cost growth that it appears to have become a matter of faith that few bother to 
challenge. Typical examples include the Government Accountability Office’s claim that 
“competition is the cornerstone of a sound acquisition process and a critical tool for achieving 
the best return on investment for taxpayers” (GAO, 2015). The enormous confidence that 
government places in competition comes despite what O’Neil (2011) points out when he notes 
that in a pair of foundational studies of defense acquisition from 50 years prior, Merton J. Peck 
and Frederic M. Scherer of the Harvard Business School revealed significant issues that are still 
largely unaddressed by intervening management efforts (Peck & Scherer, 1962; Scherer, 1964). 
In particular, Peck and Scherer (1962) argued at length that price competition, which is widely 
favored as a mechanism for controlling costs, is almost certain to be largely ineffective in major 
defense system acquisition and is actually much more likely to be counterproductive (O’Neil, 
2011). We contend that, while measures to stimulate competition may result in an increase in 
the number of bids received for MDAP Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) 
contracts, that increase in competition will not result in cost control. 
To establish which is correct—Congress and the DoD’s faith in competition or our belief 
in microeconomic theory—we sought the answers to the following questions: 
1. Does competitive prototyping lead to more competition (an increase in the number of 
bids) in the MDAP market?  
2. Does competitive contracting lead to more competition (an increase in the number of 
bids) in the MDAP market?  
3. Does more competition lead to lower cost growth or overruns in the MDAP market?  
If market competition does not control cost overruns in MDAP hardware acquisitions, then the 
defense acquisition community must devise and adopt strategies that do not need competition 
to reduce cost overruns and cost growth. 
Methodology 
This research is a case study of 36 MDAP hardware programs of various types and from 
all the services. We performed a quantitative analysis to determine the answers to our questions 
by testing the following research hypotheses:  
1. Research Hypothesis 1 (RH1): In the MDAP market, competitive prototyping leads to 
more competition. 
2. Research Hypothesis 2 (RH2): In the MDAP market, competitive contracting leads to 
more competition. 
3. Research Hypothesis 3 (RH3): In the MDAP market, competition does not lead to 
lower cost growth or lower cost overruns. 
Research Logic Flow 
As a framework for our analysis, we devised a research logic flow to describe the potential 
outcomes (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Research Logic Flow 
Table 1 shows the potential outcomes. 
Table 1. Potential Outcomes Logic Table 
Result 
Measure 





Yes Yes A 
Yes No B 
No Yes C 
No No D 
Competitive 
Contracting 
Yes Yes A 
Yes No B 
No Yes C 
No No D 
 
Data 
The data for our analysis came from six sources covering the years 2003 through 2019:  
1. U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected 
Major Weapon Programs reports,  
2. DoD Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs),  
3. Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS),  
4. Corporate 10-K reports filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC),  
5. Kamp (2019), and  
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The first step in our analysis was to confirm that the MDAP market is, in fact, an 
oligopoly. We accomplished this as described by both Hayes (2020) and Kenton (2020) by 
calculating the standard CR4 concentration ratio, which is the ratio formed by taking the sales of 
the top four firms and dividing by the total industry sales, which gives us the strength of the 
oligopoly power in the market. Concentration ratios range from 0.00 to 1.00 where 0.00 
indicates perfect competition and 1.00 indicates a perfect monopoly. Table 2 lists typical rules of 
thumb that characterize the level of concentration. 
Table 2. Mapping of Market Concentration to Market Structure and Concentration Indicators (Hayes, 
2020; Kenton, 2020) 
Level of 
Concentration 
Market Structure CR4 
Low Perfect Competition to Oligopoly 0.00–0.40 
Medium Oligopoly 0.40–0.80 
High Oligopoly to Monopoly 0.80–1.00 
 
The higher the market concentration, the less competitive the market. Table 3 shows the 
authors’ calculated CR4 MDAP market concentrations for the years 2003 to 2018, which shows 
market concentrations typical of an oligopoly market as described by (Hayes, 2020; Kenton, 
2020). 
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Once we confirmed our initial premise—the MDAP market is an oligopoly—we then 
proceeded with our data analysis.  
Next, we performed correlation analysis to verify our hypothesized relationships between 
our variables. The relationships of interest are between the measures claimed to increase 
competition—competitive prototyping and competitive contracting—and the change in 
competition and between the change in competition and cost overruns and cost growth.  
Additionally, we looked to see if there was a relationship between competitive 
prototyping and competitive contracting and between cost overruns and cost growth directly 
(i.e., due to some cause other than a change in competition). For the purposes of this research, 
we define competitive prototyping like Fast (2016)—as prototyping where two or more 
contractors develop prototypes prior to Milestone B (MS B), which are tested or demonstrated to 
the government to verify that they meet requirements. In addition, we define competitive 
contracting, in accordance with U.S. law, as a contracting strategy that relies on full and open 
competition. According to the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA, 2000), a procurement is 
considered as competed under full and open competition if all responsible sources are permitted 
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to submit sealed bids or competitive proposals. Further, we define cost overrun as described by 
Cancian (2010)—as costs that exceed the estimate for a contract, in our case the EMD phase 
contract. EMD begins with a MS B decision to continue with development and ends with the 
Milestone C (MS C) decision to proceed into the production phase. Also, we define cost growth 
for all cost growth variables as an increase in cost from the estimate at program start to MS C. 
Finally, we use the definition of competition as “the attempt by two or more companies or other 
organizations to secure the business of a customer” (Farlex, n.d.). In this research, we measure 
the degree of competition by the number of bids received for the MDAP’s EMD phase contract. 
Therefore, the greater the number of bids received for the EMD contract, the greater the degree 
of competition.  
The cost overrun variables are Cost Overrun (Cost Overrun $M) and Percent Cost 
Overrun (% Cost Overrun). Cost growth variables are Percent Change in Unit Cost 
(UC.M.PCT), Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC), Total Procurement Cost (TPC), and 
Percent Change in Total Procurement Cost (TPC.Pct). We calculated Cost Overrun $M by 
taking the difference between the baseline estimate at MS B and the current estimate at MS C 
in Base Year millions of dollars (in BY $M) from the SARs. Base Year is the prescribed DoD 
reference for measuring cost change because it removes the effect of inflation (Defense, 2020). 
% Cost Overrun was calculated by dividing Cost Overrun $M by the baseline estimate at MS B. 
UC.M.PCT came from the Kamp data set and is the percent change in the unit price since 
program start as reported in the GAO reports at MS C. It includes research and development 
(R&D) and procurement costs. A broader variable, PAUC, is the Program Acquisition Cost 
divided by the Program Acquisition Quantity as reported in the SAR reports at MS C. It includes 
all costs involved in the acquisition, not just R&D and Procurement. TPC was derived by adding 
the R&D funding (RD.M) and Procurement funding (P.M) since the program start to MS C. 
RD.M and P.M were included in the Kamp data set and came from the GAO reports. TPC.Pct 
was taken from the GAO report for MS C and is the percent change in total program cost from 
program start without regard to changes in quantity. 
For our correlation analysis, we used the Spearman rho correlation because it is useful 
for both linear and nonlinear relationships. There are no universally accepted ranges for weak, 
moderate, and strong correlation coefficients. For our purposes, we were simply looking for an 
initial way to focus our analysis. Therefore, we used the following rules of thumb in our analysis: 
Strong correlations are those relationships with a Spearman correlation coefficient greater than 
or equal to 0.667; moderate correlations are indicated by Spearman rho values greater than 
0.333 but less than 0.667; and weak correlations are those with coefficients that are less than or 
equal to 0.333. In addition, we considered significance levels for α = 0.05 and 0.01. We found 
that there is a strong relationship between our competition variables pair combinations of 
competitive prototyping and competitive contracting and Num_bids that is statistically significant. 
This indicates that the use of competitive prototyping and competitive contracting is related to 
an increase in the number of bids. However, there appears to be no relationship between 
number of bids and our cost variables: Cost Overrun $M, Pct Cost Overrun, RD.M, RD.M.Pct, 
UC.M.Pct, and PAUC Chg from SAR. These results are favorable to our hypothesized 
proposition that while competitive prototyping and competitive contracting may increase the 
number of bids, the increase in competition does not lead to a reduction in cost overruns or cost 
growth. Armed with this information, we proceeded with our statistical analysis. 
Statistical Analysis 
We selected the Mood’s Median Test as our analysis method because a visual 
examination of the histograms of our response data and probability plots from the Kolmogorov–
Smirnov tests revealed that our data are not normally distributed. This indicates that a 
nonparametric method is called for, and the Mood’s Median Test is a particularly good choice 
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because our visual inspection also indicated the presence of outliers in our response data, and 
Mood’s is insensitive to outliers. To test our research hypotheses, we evaluated 20 predictor–
response variable pairs summarized in Table 4. 
Table 4. Summary of Test Pairs 
Predictor Variables Response Variable 
Competitive prototyping (CP) Number of bids 
Competitive contracting (CC) Number of bids 
CP 
 
Cost Overrun $M 







Cost Overrun $M 





Number of bids 
 
Cost Overrun $M 






From our hypothesis testing, we found that there is evidence to support the claim that 
competitive prototyping leads to greater competition in the MDAP market, as seen by the 
statistically significant higher number of bids received on EMD contracts that included 
competitive prototyping versus those that did not. Similarly, the evidence supports the 
hypothesis that, when used, competitive contracting also increases the number of bids received 
and thus the degree of competition on MDAPs. However, we found no evidence to support the 
claim that an increase in competition (i.e., an increase in the number of bids received for an 
EMD contract) led to a decrease in cost overruns or cost growth. Furthermore, we found that 
there is no evidence to support any suspicion that competitive prototyping and competitive 
contracting themselves affect cost overruns or cost growth in MDAPs with one exception. 
Competitive contracting does appear to lead to a reduction in PAUC. There is enough evidence 
to reject the null hypothesis that the median PAUC for MDAPs that used competitive contracting 
and those that did not are equal. As a result, we can conclude that competitive contracting does 
lead to a reduction in PAUC. Since we also found that competitive contracting leads to an 
increase in competitions, one might conclude that this leads to Research Logic Flow Outcome A 
from Figure 1. However, we believe this would be a mistake. PAUC is the total of all 
development, procurement, and military construction cost divided by the number of units 
procured, and since we found no correlation between an increase in competition and 
procurement cost (P.M), nor did we see evidence that competition reduced development cost 
(RD.M, RD.M.PCT, UC.D.PCT), we must conclude that this reduction in PAUC is due to the 
portion from military construction. This seems reasonable because the construction industry is 
characterized by many small buyers and sellers more closely described by perfect competition 
where competition does influence price. A summary of these results is provided in Table 5.  
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H0 p Value Conclusion 
RH1 CP (0) 
CP (1)  
# of bids Medians 
equal 
0.000 CP leads to greater 
competition 
RH2 CC (0)  
CC (1) 
# of bids Medians 
equal 
0.004 CC leads to greater 
competition 
RH3 # of bids  Cost overruns Medians 
equal 
0.166 More competition does 
not lead to lower cost 
overruns 




0.360 More competition does 
not lead to lower % cost 
overruns 
RH3 # of bids  R&D cost growth Medians 
equal 
0.480 More competition does 
not lead to lower R&D 
cost growth 




0.145 More competition does 
not lead to lower % 
change in R&D cost 
growth 




0.802 More competition does 
not lead to lower % 
change in unit cost 
growth 
RH3 # of bids  PAUC Medians 
equal 
0.298 More competition does 
not lead to lower PAUC 
Similar results for CP and CC versus cost variable except CC versus PAUC 
 
CC (0) 
CC (1)  
PAUC Medians 
equal 
0.006 CC leads to lower 
PAUC 
Research Hypothesis 1 (RH1): In the MDAP market, competitive 
prototyping leads to more competition. 
Research Hypothesis 2 (RH2): In the MDAP market, competitive 
contracting leads to more competition. 
Research Hypothesis 3 (RH3): In the MDAP market, competition does not 
lead to lower cost growth or lower cost overruns. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The subject of cost overruns and cost growth in weapon systems programs is clearly not 
new; nor is defense acquisition reform. These topics reach back to the earliest days of our 
republic. A major theme of the modern defense acquisition reforms is that competition is good 
and will control cost. This may be true for items purchased by the DoD that are in a perfect 
competition market, such as copy paper and other consumables, where there are many buyers 
and sellers in both the civilian and defense sectors. However, attempting to apply the price 
minimizing characteristics of perfect competition to the oligopoly structure of the MDAP 
market—which behaves much differently—is inappropriate. The literature discusses some 
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virtues of competition in the MDAP market, such as helping to maintain the defense industrial 
base and improving innovation, but cost control is not among them.  
Our research shows that for the 63 hardware MDAPs we investigated in this case study, 
our assertion regarding the response to competition is correct. We demonstrated that the MDAP 
market is an oligopoly and that, while it may be possible to increase competition, the resulting 
competition will not lead to lower cost overruns or cost growth as Congress and the DoD 
believe. 
Moreover, we answer all three of our research questions. Competitive prototyping does 
lead to more competition (an increase in the number of bids) in the MDAP market. Additionally, 
we show that competitive contracting also leads to more competition (an increase in the number 
of bids) in the MDAP market. Finally, we demonstrate that more competition does not lead to 
lower cost growth or cost overruns in the MDAP market. Table 6 and Figure 2 show these 
results in terms of our Research Logic Flow. We believed that either Outcome B or C from our 
Research Logic Flow would be proven to be correct. Our results show that Outcome B is the 
correct logic flow path as we proposed.  
Table 6. Logic Table Outcome 
Result Measure Increase Competition? Reduce Cost Overruns/Cost Growth? Outcome 
Competitive Prototyping 
Yes Yes A 
Yes No B 
No Yes C 
No No D 
Competitive Contracting 
Yes Yes A 
Yes No B 
No Yes C 
No No D 
 
 
Figure 2. Research Logic Flow Outcome 
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Lastly, our analysis shows that, in addition to competition not affecting cost 
outcome for the hardware MDAPs we studied, competitive prototyping and competitive 
contracting themselves do not affect cost outcomes. 
Unfortunately, the DoD’s confidence in the power of competition to control cost in 
MDAPs appears to be based on the perfect competition model rather than the 
appropriate oligopoly model. This is a misapplication of microeconomic theory. We have 
shown that for our case study programs, competition does not control cost under 
oligopoly as microeconomic theory predicts. Therefore, we suggest that the DoD and 
Congress must look elsewhere for solutions to the problem of cost overruns and cost 
growth in MDAPS. 
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